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The effect of quotas on fmns' incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D is studied in 
a two-stage price-setting duopoly. A domestic and a foreign fmn choose initially R&D efforts 
and then set the prices of their differentiated products in the domestic market. With a quota 
imposed at, or close to, the free-trade level of imports, the domestic fmn faces less 
competition than under free-trade and chooses to invest less in R&D. Contrarily, the 
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in its cost is now absent. These results differ from the Coumot duopoly case in which R&D 
expenditures are lower for both fmns. We also show that as the quota becomes more 
restrictive, the domestic fmn increases and the foreign fmn decreases its expenditures in R&D. 
Finally, we show that domestic welfare is a1ways higher under free-trade than under any quota 
regardless of the degree of product substitutability. 
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Abstract 
The dfect of quotél~ on firms: incentive to iuve!:it 
in co!:it-reducing R&D i::; !:itudied in a two-!:itage price­
::;etting duopoly game .. A domestÍC' élud a fo1'eigu film 
choo::;e initially R&D effort!:i alld theu !:iet the prices 
of their diffel'elltiated product!:i in the dmne!:itic mar­
ket. \Vith él quota impo!:ied aL 01' dO!:ie to. the free­
trade leve! of import!:i: the dome!:itic finll faces le!:is 
cOlllpetitioll thau under free-trade aud choose!:i to in­
vest les!:i in R&D. Contrarily, the cou!:itrained foreign 
firlll ¡uve::;ts more in R&D as the negative strate­
gic effect of a reduction in its cost i!:i now ab:;eut. 
The!:ie re!:iults differ frOI!l the Coumot duopoly case 
,¡ 
in which R&D expenditure!:i are lower foI' both D.1'IllS. 
\Ve abo show that as the quota. becollles more re­
strictive, the dome:;tic finll ill<:rease:; and the foreign 
firm de creases its e>"1>euditures ou R&D. Fiually, \Ve 
show that domestic \Velfare is always higber uuder 
free-trade than under' axiy quota regardless of the 
degree of product ~"Ubstitua.bility. 
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1 Introduction 
The use of trade policies aimed at protecting domestic industries is some­
times justified llsing the "infant industry" argumento Those in favor of this 
type of policies argue t,hat t.rade protection is industry-promoting in the sense 
that domestic producers. sheltered from foreign competition, can choose long­
run strategic varia.bles]. which \'.rill ensure Jong-run gains in profitability2. 
Investment in cost-reducing innovation is one of such strategic variables. 
Proteccion)st mea sures have been shown to affect this variable choice in the 
;'wrong': direction, as sho\Vn by Reitzes (1991). 
Reitzes (1991) looks élt t-he impact of quotas (and tariffs) on strategic 
R&D behavior. Using a two-st.age Cournot duopoly game, where firms ¡ni­
tiaUy choose R&D levels and subsequently compete in quantities, Reitzes 
shows that both the domestic and the foreign firm choose lower levels of 
cost-reducing R&D when a guota is set at the free trade level of production 
than undel' free tra.de. The reason for the decline in R&D is that, in the 
J 
presence of a quota, the strategic value of R&D vanishes. vVith a quota, 
the domestic firm becomes a monopolist on the residual demand, and thus 
1Examples oí strat.egi(" ,·atiable . ., are' quality, R&:D iu,?estmeut. expellditl1re on innova­
t.iOIl etc .. 
:2This is the political economy argumeut towards iníaut iuc1ustry proteetiou. The eco­
llonlle argument for industry protectioll refers to spillovers. Either of these two arguments 
may be behind protecdolllst. practiees. In this paper, we are eoneerned with the fornler 
argumento The case of India. where industrialists wholeheartedly supported the erection 
of import barriers, lea.diug to the erectioll of substantial regulatory barriers, is an example 
of tbe desire to ensure the 'growth' of domes tic iudustry through protection (Kujal, 1996) .. 
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choose'l its cost-l11inil11izillg level of R&D expenditures. The foreign firm, 
constrained by the ctuantity it l11ay sello will also have les s incentives to in­
'\"est in cost red uction. With the exception of Reitzes (1991 L very 1i ttle has 
been written on the effects of this type of protection on firms' investment in 
cost-reducing assets. 
In this papel', the objective is to study \vhether Reitzes' (1991) results 
still hold under price cOl11petition, since it. is known that price competition 
produces effects on incentives to innovate which differ frol11 the Cournot 
cOl11petition case. For instauce. Bester and Petrakis (1993) silo\\' that if 
the dOl11esiic and the foreign goods are relatively close substitutes, Cournot 
competition provides weaker incentives to invest in cost-reducing R&D than 
Bertrand competition. 
Contrar)' to Reitzes' (1991) results (where both firm invest less in R&D) 
it is shown that in a. price setting game, when a quota is set at the free trade 
level, the domestic firm lowers and the foreign firm increases its expenditures 
on R&D. Under price competition, foreign investment in R&D has a nega­
tive indirect (strategic) effect on foreign firnú profits: more foreign firm's 
investment in R&D makes the domestic firm lower its price, which in turn 
results in lower price and profits for the foreign firmo This makes the foreign 
firm "underinvest" in R&D. With the introduction of a quota, this negative 
effect disappears and investment in R&D increases necessarily for the con­
strained case. Under Cournot compe.tition, the strategic effect has just the 
opposite sign, which ~xplains this reversal in results. On the contrary, and 
as in Reitzes (1991), the domestic firm underinvests in R&D because, after 
4 
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the imposition 01' the quota, it faces less competition from the foreign firmo 
\Ve further sho\\" that these qualit.ative reslllts depend also on how re­
strictive t he qllota is. As the quota beeomes more restrictive the domestic 
firm inereases and the foreign firm deereases its expenditures on ~I¿D. For a 
restrictive enough qtlota. the domestic firm's level 01' R&D expenditure may 
exceed t,he free trade leyel, and the foreign firm's may deerease relatively 
to the free tra<1e case. These results are important since, unlike suggested 
by the infant industry protection argument, st.rategic variable choiees may 
change in the "wrong" direction: if les s R&D ta.l~es plaee domestieally while 
¡he foreign 'fírm inereéL'3es ¡ts o\ .... n effort to reduce costs, the relative domestic 
procluction cost inereases. This also renders less likely that protection wiU 
be just t.emporary, if the domest.ic fírm is to survive future competition. Do­
mes tic R&:D efforts may increase, but this can onl)' be achieved if the quota 
is restrictiw enollgh. 
Finally. \\'e show that domestic welfare is always maximól . under free 
trade independently of the degree of product differentiation. l.'his result con­
st.itutes a strong argument against this type of proteccionist' policies. If the 
country wishes, nevertheless, to impose a quota, the "optimal quota" de­
pends on the degree of product differentiation. If the goods are close enough 
substitutes, it is optimal to set the quota at zero, i.e., to completely shut 
the fOl'eign firm out of the domestic market. If the goods are significantly 
differentiated, then the optimal quot~ level is the free·trade level of produc­
tion. This may explain why in many developing countries, close substitutes 
to domestic production were completely shut out of the market. 
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The papel' is organized as follows. In Sect.ion :2 the model is presented 
and equilibrium under free trade determined. In Section 3, equilibrium after 
the imposition of an import quota is determined fol' a sequential move price 
~etting game. Section 4 presents the welfare analysis and Section .5 concludes. 
2 'The nl0del under free trade 
Th¡;!'E' are two firms, one domestic and one foreign. Fimls produce goods 
\yhich are imperfect substitutes and seU their pl'oduction in the domestic 
ll1rtrket only. Firms face the following (symmetric) demand functions3 : 
1 
Xi = 1 2[a(1 -1) - Pi + -:!1j], i,j = 1,2. (1) 
- ~I 
-, measures the degree of product differentiation. As "1 goes to zero, 
each firm becomes a local monopolist. When "1 goes to one, nrms' goods are 
almost perfed substitutes. To avoid comer solutions, we sha11 assume that 
i :S 0.827891. The domestic nrm is denoted by i = 1, and the foreign firm by 
¡ = 2. Both firms have initially the same unit production costs, c. Firms can 
invest. in R&D in order to reduce their unit costo In particular, by investing 
~f firm i will reduce its cost by l:lj. 
Firms playa two-stage game. In stage one, fi~ms simultaneously decide on 
how much to invest in cost-reducing R&D. In stage two, given the (reduced) 
3These are the c1emand functiolllS of a representative cOllsuxner with ut,ility u(zi,zi) = 
olz. + xi) - (xl + xJ + 2"'(XiXj )/2+ m ~-ith m reprE'sE'ming money. following Dixit (1979). 
Resuhiug inverse demand is Pi = a - Xi - "'(Xj. 
6 
unit. cost, firms decide simulta.neously on which price to seto It should be 
no!ed that R&D has a comrnit.ment value in this cOlltr:,xt. Finns can use R&D 
strategically to improve their position in the subsequent market competition 
game. The problem is solved recursively for the equilibrium outcomes, Le., 
we restrict our attentioll to the subgame perfect equilibria. 
(íj t/¡( mw'¡,tI compe.t.ition stl/f}f:: 
firm i chooses ]Ji to maximize profits: 
max[Pi - (e - .6.¡) }Xi(Pi,]Jj). 
Pj and ~i are t.aken as giver.. This defines each firm's reaction function: 
.. _ a(1 - /,) + e - b.¡ + /,Pi 
]Ji = b¡(l)j·0.¡) = 2 . (2) 
In figure 1, firms' reaction functions under free trade are depicted. The 
dashed line b¡(pj) represents the price firm i will choose to set given firm j's 
pnce ]Ji' 
7 

.
,
,
,
, 
I 
: 
I ~~~ b¡ (p~) 
I .. ~ .. 
, """., ..... 
1'* " • .. .. • • .. .. • ~'i»""' ... ." .... ¡ _........ -:, 
... ""' ... "'" , . 
......... .,...... :. 

t • 
, 
t 
I 
I 
I 
,t 
, 
,
t 
p* P
., 
"! 
Fig,ll'C' 1 

Then equilibrium ¡n'ices anc1 profit~ are: 

(3 ) 
and 
A2
.0.. 
I (-1:)
2 
tií) the Rf:5D st.ag€ 
Firm i, given D.j, chooses D.¡ to maximize its profits (defined in (4). From 
t.he first-order conditions and symmetry we obtain optimal R...\!:D spending, 
output and price for each firm: 
(5) 
(6) 
8 
3 
p. ::= .) ~ ~)a.(l - ~; )+ e - .6."]. (7)
- , 
Firms' profits are then given by 

_ 8 - 16-/ + 7,4 - -/ 2 

Ti = Dh)2 (a - e) . (8) 
\".here D(¡) = (1 + ~:)(2 - ))(4 - "P) - 2(2 - 12). 
Note that under price competition a firm has less incentives to invest in 
cost-reducing R&D than undel' apure cost-minimizing strategy. There is a. 
negative strategic effect when firms compete in prices. As a response to firm 
i's reduction of unit cosí.. it.s rival decreases its price (see (3)), thu$ shifting-in 
i'5 demand fUllction. Firm i has no\\' to reduce its price in order to seU the 
same output. By lo\yering it.s R&D expenditures beyond the cost-minimizing 
leve!. a firm can commit. to a softer c:ompetition in the subsequent ma.rket 
game. 
Equilibriu111 under inlport quotas. 
In this section we assume that the domestic government precommits to a 
given quota level fi~ beíore the firms decide bow much to invest in R&D. For 
illustrative purposes we sha.1l concentrate on the analysis oí the case where 
a quota is set at the free-trade level of imports, A similar reasoning applies 
to tbe case of more restrictive quo'tas. Henceforth, firm 2 (the foreign firm) 
is assumed to be restricted to seU no more than x units, with x being set at 
tbe free-trade level oí imports as defined by (6). 
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3.1 The best response functions 
As ~::own by Krishna (1989), the imposition of quantity restrictions alters 
tirms' b~t. re-sponse funct.ions in the market competition stage4 , Let us d~fine 
lIPI' ,7:' as the foreign firm:s price level that yields a demand for its good just 
equé'l te· .r, Clea.rly, this ís a functíon of t.he price selected by the dornestic firm 
]11· In :=:gure 2, ¡(PI. x) is represented by the dashed line between b2(p¡) and 
bl (P2 j. Sinte the quota is set at the free-trade equilibrium level of production, 
t his I¡!le- has to go througl1 the free-t.rade equilibriu111 point (the point where 
the original reaction functions b¡(p;) inte1'sect). Above f(p¡,x), the foreign 
fi1'm i~ Í)ound by the rest1'iction while below it the restriction is not binding. 
Firm :r~ best response is not altered fr0111 the free-trade case if PI < pM since 
optirnal pricing decisions do not invoh'e firrn 2's production exceeding x: the 
domestic firrn's price is low enough for firrn 2's production to be below its 
free trade level, now the quota level. However, if the domestic firm's price 
exceeds the free-trade equilibrium price, Le. if PI > p.. , then, in the absence 
of a quota, the foreign firm \Vonld like to produce more than x. But that is 
no longer possible. The foreign firm's best response is then to select a price 
high enough so that ¡ts demand is just equal to the quota level x. In this 
case, the best response function c,?incides with the f(Ph x) lineo Firm 2'5 
best response functíon is depicted in figure 2, given by the kinked full line 
-4T~ derivation oí the best response fun<:tiollS that follows draws on Kdshlla (1989). 
la 
if PI ::; J', 
ir}JI > ]l-. 
T: .::ing 1) this Céll-;' be written as: . 
(((1 - -d + e - ~2 + }
= lllax { -----:.-)----'--,0(1 - 1') - (1- ·l);i· + 7]Jl . 
L-:-t lIS ::.ow turn to the determination of the domestic firm's best response 
:\1nO:: ion. ::"et liS define F(P2"'f) as the function that det.ermines the domes tic 
~,ric.:- le\'.;: which. given ]>2, yields a demancl level fol' the foreign product 
.:.xac:ly e.=:.!é'd to .r', Gré'lphically, F(P2,:r) coincides with f(]Jhi), since one 
:·'.1nC ion : ~ the illverse 01' the other. b~' definition. \Vhen firm 2 is bound 
'-;y ~:::e CjL::·ta le\'el, then domestic finn's demancl depends only on its own 
~,nc.:-: PI = (J - .1'1 ;-;r.. Hence, aboye F(P2, fí·). the domestic firm's isoprofit 
~1.1lT-:-S ar~ horizontal and there is a unique price, j5¡, whic.h maximizes its 
?l'ot:s. Ir. ¡his case, some consumers are rationed by the (low-priced) foreign 
:1rm. Ass:.:.:me the following rationing rule: consumers lucky enough to buy 
:he foreig=. firm's good, are able to resell it costlessly in thp. market. This 
-situation i:!' equivalent to the foreign firm selecting a best reply to ih. This, 
:n turn, gl.:.arantees a profit level of V to the domestic firm, the same as the 
profits th.a.¡ a St,ackelberg lea,der, who makes the quota bind on the foreign 
firmo can .a.<:hieve. 
Relow F(P2,X), the domestic fl.rm's isoprofit curves remain the same as 
undel' free-nade. As a result, isoprofit curves are kinked.along F(P2' x), and 
moreover they are 110t convex anymore. If the foreign firm's price is higher 
11 
t.han p;, t.hen the domestic firm can reach a profit level higher than V by 
choosing not t.o make the fOl'eign firm bound by the qnot.a. If, however, the 
foreign firm 's price is lower tha.p. p;, the domestic firm can always guarantee 
profits of l/ by choosing ¡)1- Firm 1 's best response fundíon is given by the 
two clark dashed lines in figure 2 and is defined by b1(P2, x): 
'l:1.;p) ) 
I 
I 
,I 
I 
I 
,I 
\" 
P::Y:? P 2 
Figu.¡·" 2 
It should be noted that firm 1 '5 best response function is Dot continuous 
and that it assumes two values when P2 = p; (the same profit level V can be 
reached charging either Pl or p¡). 
3.2 Equilibrium with séquential moves 
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V/hen firms choose prices simultaneously, there is a unique equilibrium 
Jl1 mixed strategies in the market competition game '\'here the foreign firm 
chooses p; and the domestic firm randomizes over (pI, l3d, (see Krishna 
(1989)). In this equilibrium the domestic firm always obtains profits of V: 
the profit level that a. domestic firm could attain as a Stackelberg leader that 
males the quota bind on the foreign firmo The domestic firm is, thus, indif­
ferent bet\,,,'een being a. price leader 01' choosing its price simultaneously with 
its rival. The foreign firm, ho\\"ever, obtains strictly lower profits than the 
Stackelberg follo,,"er' s profits5 . As a result. \Ve argue t-hat it is reasonable to 
assume thát the foreign firm \\"illlet the domestic firm set its price before it 
chooses its o,,"n. since by acting as a Stackelberg follo,,"er in the price com­
petition game it guarantees higher profits. Hence, the imposition of a quota 
chélnges the nature of the game. We therefore assume that the firms choose 
their pricps sequentially with the domestic firm being the Stackelberg leader 
and the foreign firm the Stackelberg follower in the price setting game (as in 
Harris (1985) re;. 
So fal' \Ve have only treated the case of a quota imposed at the free-trade 
5This is t.roe since a St.a.ckelber~ Collower (Coreip;ll) firIn sets a lú~her price than in the 
5imul.t.aneous move ~aII!e (P2 > p~) and, mOl'eover, it sells always at the quota level fi. As 
we saw. under simllltaneous choice oC ¡>lices, the fOl'ei~u firm sells at t.he quota level oul)' 
when t.he dOlUe'5t.ic firm sets it.s pl'ice at p¡, while it sells less than x when the domes tic 
prke is Pl. in t.he núxe<! st.rat.eg)' eqlliliblÍmn. Thus, t.he foreigu firm a.tt.a.ins higher profits 
whenever it. acts as a Stackelber~ follower. 
6:Not.e that qualitatively sinúlar reslllts hold even when firms set their prices simultane­
ou51)'. For the reasons mentioned aboye aod ~ven that. mixed strate~ies in the simultaneous 
lllove ~ame Si~lÚficantly cOlUplicat.e t.he ailalysis, we have opted COI' exposing the sequential 
lUove ~a.1lle ouly. The analytical t·reat·ment. oC the Bertraud game is ava.ilable upon request. 
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leve} of imports. A sim,ilar analysis applies to more restrictive quotas. In 
what follo\\"5. we t.ake as given t,hat the imposition of any quott'l alters the 
sequence oí priee ehoiees in the market. game. 
The game beeomes a 3-sta.ge game. In the first stage. both firms seleet 
R&D leYels. In the seeond stage. the domestic firm sets it.s priee. and in the 
t.hird stage. the foreign firm selects its priee. 
(i) 8fage-3 
Given ~l • .6.2 and P1! the foreign firm sells .í:, and charges the market 
clearing price: 
(9) 
(ii) sfagt-:! 
The domestic firm is now a, constrained monopolist facing a residual de­
ma.nd ;tl = DR(]Jl) = a - 7X - Pl' Then its profit maximizing price and 
output le\'els are: 
a + e - 7X - 6} (10)PI = 2 
(l - 7X + 6 1e - (11)Xl = 2 

Resulting profits a,re 

(12) 
14 
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It. should be noted tbat tlle domestic price and profits do not depend on 
.6.:./. Note also tha.t, whell the quota. is binding on the foreign firm, R&D has 
no strategic value for the domestic firm. Hence, it will simply choose the 
cost-minimizing level oí R&D, acting as a constrained monopolist. 
Substituting (10) into (9). \Ve obtain the foreign firm's price and profits: 
(1:3) 
{ a(2-J)-(2-~?).i+(C-6¡)-¡ }_ ó~ ií2 = - e +6 2 x - - (14)2 2 
Note that" whatever the reduction of its unit cost, the foreign firm always 
sells at the quota level. As a result, its marginal revenue from a reduction in 
its unit cost is simply equal to the quota level itself. Hence, the imposition 
of the quota removes the negative strategic effect which was present under 
free-trade price-competition. 
(iii) siage-l 
Maximizing profits as defined by (12) and (14), and solving the first-order 
conditions, \Ve get the optimal R&D levels for the domestic and the foreign 
firms: 
.6.1 = a - e - JX (15) 
(16) 
Domestic R&D decreases with the quotaleveL As the quota becomes more 
restrictive on the foreign firm, the domestic firm's residual demand increases 
15 
and thus also the profitability of a reduction in its unit costo Contrarily, 
foreign R&D levels increa.se with the quota level and in a. one-to-one relation. 
This is beca.use, as we sa.w, the foreign firm's marginal revenue of a reduction 
-
in unit cost 1S equal to the quota, while the marginal cost 1S 1:::..2, 
Figure 3 depicts Ai as a function' of the level of the quota x imposed on 
t-he foreigl1 firmo 
x., x¡, x· 
Figure 3 
Finally, prices, quantities and profits can now be determined: 
~ 
PI :::: e (17) 
(18) 
Xl = a - c- ¡X (19) 
X2 = X (20) 
~ (a-c-¡x)2 (21)11"1 = 2 
16 
.1 
(22) 
Domestic profits increase as the quota becomes more rcstríctive, sinee 
more residual demand allows the domestie firm to attain higher profit levels, 
while foreign profits deerease':", 
Proposition 1 : The domestic firm invests less in cost l'eduction (lit < l:::.") 
for a quota sef at) 01' do.se to, the free-trade leve! (5': = x") than under free 
tro.dé. As the quota (fe) becomes more 'resf7ictive, lit inc7'eases, 
Proof: With a quot.a set at the free-trade le\"el, i.e" with x = x*, the 
resulting invest.ment. in cost-reducing tecllology {lid will be below the free 
trade \'alue (6."): 
.6.1 is decreasing in i since Li l = a - e -¡X, • 
Proposition 2: The foreign firm invests more in cost reduction (li2 > 
.6: )than unde1' free-tmde tuhen a quota is set at, 01' close to, tlle f1'ee-trade 
leve!. lnvestment in R&iD decl'eases toith tlle l'est7ictiven.ess of the quota. Jf 
the quota is sufficiently restrictive (in particular f01' X < .l:::.") 1 the foreign 
firm invest.s Iess than under free trade. 
7t.his is easny shown, 
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Proof: vVit,h a. quota set. al t,he free-trade level, i.e., with i == x", the result­
ing investment in cost.-l'educing technology (.6.2 ) wiII be a.boye the free-trade 
level (.6:): ¿2(X = x·) = x· > ~ .. (from (6)). Since.6.2 = X, this implies 
t-hat, for levels of restríction les s than free trade level of innovation fe < 1:::.", 
the foreign firm will invest less than it does under free trade. • 
When a restraint is set at t,he free-tra.de level of imports the foreign firm 
chooses to innovate more and the domestic firm less8 • The results under 
price competition differ frol11 those obtained under Cournot competition, 
where both the domestic and the foreign firm lower their R&D expenditures 
aft.er the imposition of the Cjuota (Reitzes (1991)). The reason is that, under 
Cournot competition. foreign R&D spending has a. positive indirect (strate­
gic) effect on foreign firm's profits, while under Bertrand competition this 
effect is a negative one. Under price competition, a foreign firm's increase 
in R&D spending leads the domestic firm to lower its price, which in turn 
results in lower price and profits for the foreign firmo The foreign firm thus 
"underinvests" in R&D when there is free trade. Once a qtiota is imposed 
th1S strategic effect vanishes. since the domestic price no longer depends on 
íoreign firm's choice of R&D spending. Consequently, more investment in 
cost-reducing R&D ta.kes place in the constrained case than in the uncon­
strained case. The effect Oll the unconstrained domestic firm is just the 
opposite. It spends less on R&D after the imposition oí the quota because 
6It sbould at tbis point be stressed tbat botb propositions 1 and 2 bold under the 
simult.aneous lllove gallle. Pro()fs are ava.ilable frolll tbe authors Up011 request. 
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it faces lt'::;s competition (s:nce fhe foreign firm iti no", constra:ined). 
4 Welfare 
In this section t\\'o questions are analyzed: (i) Ir a quota is to be imposed 
on t.he foreign count.ry. which is t.he optimal quota level that t,he domestic 
country should selecto if the objective is to maximize domestic 'Velfare? aud 
(ji) Does th}s rest.riction 011 t.rade improve domestic \Velfare'! 
To compute the consumer surplus. recall that preferences are quasi-linear9 • 
Hence. 
l~!'ling (17) - (20) and simplifying. "'e get: 
(23) 
Total domestic welfare (TlF) is defined a.':i the sum of the consumer surplus
.' 
aud the domestic firm's profits: 
Tl-F = es + 7Í"1' 
Then, using (21) we get 
-1
'2 _ .1'
TW =(a - e) -'-¡x(a - e) + 2 . (24) 
9See footnote 2. 
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It. can ea.sily be seel1 that t.otal domestie welfare initialIy decl'eases with fe, 
it rea.ches a minimum at. ;1' = ,/(0 - e) and then Ínel'eases with x. Hence, it 
reaehes its maximum either at x = O or at x = x" depending on the degree 
of produet substituability, 
Figure 4 represents total welfare as a function of the produet differenti­
at.ion parameter, ~11O. TlV(x = O) represents total welfare when the foreign 
firm is shut out. of the market, which is given by (a - c}2 and is indepen­
dent of the degree of product differentiation. TW(x = x·) represents welfare 
when the c¡uota is set at the free-trade level of production. It can be shown 
that shuti~g out the foreign firm is optimal for the domestic government if 
í' < 0.391247. while imposing a quota at the f1'ee-trade level of imports is 
optimal 1'01' -¡ > 0.:3!:)1247. 
On the o1.he1' hand, under free trade total welfare is THíF = CSF + TI"', 
where (see footnote 2) 
Using (6) - (8) and simplifying, we get: 
(25) 
10\\'e will rest.l'ict OUl' attemioll to I < 0.821891 since this condition is necessary to 
gl.laral1t,ee 71'; ;::: O. 
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., 
1.;:)(a-<) • 
(a-c":! I___..;::::...,.,..-_~==__--
. 
•nr(x=x") 
r 
11.3!1l2-:1' 0.827891 
Figul"C' -:1 
In figure.f, total domestic \\"elfal'e under free u'ade is represented by the 
upper lineo That ¡s. free u'ade leads to a higher domestic wetfare t,han the 
optimal l'estriction rOl' auy vaIue of the product substituabiIity parameter. 
One can then conclude that. if a. <{uota is to be imposed, it is optima.l to 
set. I: = :1'- ir 7 < 0.:)91247 and to set. 5' = oif "¡ > 0.391247. This is a.Iong 
the Iiue of the import substitution argument: dosel' substitutes to domestic 
goods are subject to tighter impol't restrictions. However. welfare is higher ir 
t here is free trade. This resuIt is t.rue for any degree of product pifferentia.tiol1 . •. 
The reMon is that quotas act as collusion faciIitating pra.ctices. As a. result, 
consumers pay much higher prices after the imposition of the quota. and 
thus consumer surplus is reduced substantia.lly. TIle increases in domestic 
firm's profits. on the other hand. is not enough to compensate fol' the 10ss 
in the consumer surplus. This constitutes a very strong result against the 
imposition oí quotas. . 
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5 Conclusions 
Thi$ papel" shows that. lindel' 'price compet.it.ion. when a quantity ("011­
straillt is imposed at the free t,rade Je-n'l \)1' production. or dose t.o it.. the 
foreign nrm increa.<>es its expenditures on R&D. Tile domest.ic firmo howevel'. 
chooses to spend less than in the absence of t.hat qualltity restriction. These 
results differ from the Cournot competition case analyzed by Reitzes (1991). 
lindel' price competition. fOl'eign investment in R&D has a negative ~trategic 
effect on foreign firnú profi ts: more ¡nvest ment in R&D by the foreign firm 
makes t he domestic firm }o,,"er its own price. \\"hich in turn results in lower 
foreign firm's price and profit levels. vVith the introdllction of a quota this 
negali\"{' effed disappears and foreign firm's investment in R&D necessarily 
increases. U ncler Cournot competition, lhe strategic effect has the opposite 
signo \\"hich explains this reversal in results fOl" the foreign firmo 
\\:e furt-her show t,hat this paper shows that, as the qllota becomes more 
restrictin'. lhe domestic firm increases its spending on R&D while the foreign 
. 
firm decreases it.. In thi5 !:iense, results in line with the "infant-industry­
argument. in favor of pl'otection can be achieved with a <¡uota but only if it. 
is sufficient.ly restrictive. Additionally, \Ve. show that the optimal quota le.vel 
(Le. the quota level that maximizes domestic \Velfare, given that a quota 
x will be irnpose.d al 01' below the free-trade. level of production) depends 
on the degree of product differentiation. For large enough values of I (in 
particular for "1 > 0.391247) it 1S optimal to have the foreign f!t:m shut out of 
22 
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I 
!I 
the hOl11e market.(;f = O). Otherwise. lbe If>\'el 01' restrict.ion that is optimal 
is t.he free> t.rade len"¡ of product.ion..\s in t.l1e "infaut. industry'" a.rgument, 
indust.rie:; producillg dose substitutes to pot.ential imports desire protectioll. 
Fillally. it. is shown t.hat domestic welfare is always lower in the presence 
01' a <Iuantit;. restrictioll than lindel' free trade. This resulto is independent 
of the degree of product differentiation. 01' the level of t,he l'estriction. This 
constitutes a. strong argument. against the imposition of quantity restrictions, 
such as <¡lIotas and VERso The empirical evidence from countries that used 
1his t.ype of regulatory policy clearly does not lend support to the infant 
inc\l..1stry p{ot.ection argument either . 
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